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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MA in Art, Law and Economy at the 
International Hellenic University.  
  The Internet has become a part of our everyday life. It has enhanced and 
enriched our lives making it possible for us to access information from anywhere in the 
world in the blink of an eye. However, it has also been used for illegal activities such as 
sharing copyright protected works without authorization, thus leading to the 
widespread of cyberpiracy. 
 In an effort to protect their rights, copyright holders turned to ISPs as providers 
of information services for help to identify the infringers by revealing their users’ 
personal data in order to initiate proceedings against them. Occasionally, right holders 
held ISPs liable for copyright infringements as enablers of service which was used to 
perform an illegal act.  
 This further led to the collision of the fundamental rights to privacy, to conduct 
business, to protect property and the freedom of expression. As it threatened to 
endanger EU Single Market, the European Union attempted to establish a desired 
balance among fundamental rights through legal regulations and CJEU case law.  
The focus of this paper is on the legal status and liability of ISPs in the process of 
unauthorized distribution of copyright protected works in digital environment by using 
services they provide.  
 Through examination of relevant regulations and case law, this paper proposes 
that the solution to the problem of digital piracy, without disturbing the balance of 
fundamental rights and neutral status of ISPs’ can be found by combining legal 
provisions, the advantages of innovative technologies and educational measures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of cyberspace and digital technologies has impacted the 
creation and distribution of copyright-protected works. It made it possible for the 
copyright protected works to reach wider public, however, it also lessened the control 
of the right holders have over their publication and communication. In recent years 
technology has enabled flourishing of unauthorised cross-border distribution of 
protected works. The appearance of large-scale piracy has impacted not only individuals 
but also the EU Single Market. Due to such extensive impact, the EU was determined to 
take necessary steps to restore the proper functioning of Single Market, through 
harmonization of copyright and its enforcement.  
Additionally, the EU has a great interest in resolving cyber piracy as a part of the 
Digital Single Market Strategy. Through this Strategy, the EU is hoping to create a fair 
competition business environment by making use of digital tools, which is to say that 
cyber infringements of copyright must be resolved.1  
However, the solution turned out to be more complex than expected due to 
specific interests of different stakeholders. The ultimate solution had to satisfy the right 
holders and their right to control their work, without disrupting the functioning of the 
Internet, which meant allowing ISPs to freely conduct their business and for users to 
remain anonymous. In order to ensure uninterrupted functioning of the Internet, the EU 
established a legal immunity for ISPs in cases where their role was purely technical and 
automatic without intentional interference with the content.  
On the other hand, the right holders wanted to identify infringers in order to bring 
proceedings against them, however, they realised that such quest was arduous in an 
anonymous, cyber environment. Therefore, they turned to ISPs. In an online 
environment, ISPs enable communication by connecting users or hosting content 
provided by third parties. Right holders requested the ISPs, to help them identify users 
who were illegally communicating their work and/or to be held secondary liable for 
copyright infringement, as they were the enablers of the illegal act of communication. 
                                                 
1 For further reference see: “Digital single market - Bringing down barriers to unlock online 
opportunities” available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en, last 
accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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The ISPs were reluctant to reveal the identity of their users, due to provisions protecting 
the privacy of personal data and fear of losing clients. This puzzling situation has led to 
numerous cases before the CJEU in search for a balance of the fundamental rights to 
property, privacy and freedom to conduct business.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an insight into ISPs’ liability for the infringing 
content provided online by a third party using ISP’s services under EU legislation. In 
order to fully understand the position of ISPs, this paper will also analyse legal 
framework regulating rights and interests of other stakeholders such as copyright right 
holders and the users of ISP’s services.  
The first part presents the EU legal framework governing the status of 
stakeholders involved in copyright infringement. Each stakeholder strives to protect 
their own interest, which creates a tension that the EU tried to balance and harmonise 
through multiple directives. 
The second part is devoted to the CJEU case law, providing an insight into the 
manner in which these directives were interpreted in specific cases. Through case law 
the Member States were given additional specified guidelines on how to interpret and 
transpose directives into national legislation. 
The third part provides examples of mechanisms chosen by Member States and 
private entities in order to incorporate provisions and court judgments regulating ISPs’ 
liability while respecting challenges that each of them encountered within their national 
legislative system in the process of balancing interests and requests of stakeholders.
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1. OPENING REMARKS  
 
 
1.1 Digital piracy as a background story of ISPs’ liability for copyright infringements 
 
 The issue of ISPs liability for copyright infringement is interconnected with digital 
piracy. Digital piracy can be defined as an unauthorised performance of any act which is 
considered to be an exclusive right of the right holder by using the Internet whether for 
lucrative purposes or not.  
The Digital Age has allowed for the production of copies of copyright-protected work 
without any disturbance to the quality of the sound and/or image, with marginal costs and 
no need for physical carriers of the copies. The internet has made the access to and the 
transfer of said work possible at the speed of light from one side of the globe to another. 
This presents a fertile ground for digital piracy. 
 Even though the right holders are granted limited legal monopoly on reproduction 
and distribution of the work, these rights have become difficult to enforce in the digital 
environment. Once the work appears online, it is generally impossible to remove every copy 
or to block its further distribution.  
 Consequently, this disturbed the right holders’ monopoly, by allocating resources 
from right holders to infringers and thus affecting the market. There has been a need for 
legal reaction at the EU level not only to protect the rights of the right holders but also to 
restore order in the internal market.  
  
1.2 Who to blame for unauthorized online sharing of copyright protected works - users 
or ISPs? 
 
 An ISP is a legal entity providing services, to its clients against a contract based fee. 
It can provide a connection to the network by connecting clients to the server (access 
provider), facilitate data transmission by providing technical services (network provider) or 
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rent space on its own server for users to upload content (host provider).2 Due to the 
development of the Internet, these services are not easily distinguished today.  
The distinction has to be made between the secondary and primary liability of ISPs. 
Primary liability means that an ISP, a natural or legal entity, has performed an act of 
copyright infringement. Secondary liability means, that there is no direct line between an 
ISP and the act of infringement; however, the ISP has in some form enabled or facilitated 
this infringement. In P2P file sharing, an ISP as an access provider has provided a connection 
which was used to transfer infringing files. As a host provider it provided space in which the 
infringing material was made available to the public.  
 Furthermore, if infringing content is shared by a user, regardless of whether it is a 
P2P file sharing or if it is made available on a specific site, the user, as the content provider, 
is directly liable. However, a problem arises as the identification of the user is not so simple. 
In a digital environment, users are represented by an IP addresses which are assigned to 
them every time they log on. IP address is a combination of numbers meaningless to an 
ordinary person. However, a service provider can decode the IP address and translate it into 
personal data such as name, address, age etc. The data assigned to the IP address is 
unmistakably personal data within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the Directive 95/46 due to 
this connection to a specific person.3 This means that other users remain anonymous for 
the rest of us, while the ISP can perform the operation of identification of their users and 
determine their true identity. 
  
1.3 How did ISPs get in the midst of the battle between the right to property and the 
right to privacy? 
  
 This happened for several reasons. Firstly, ISP provides ‘tools’ which enable 
unauthorized distribution of copyright-protected work and is in the best technical position 
                                                 
2 Perset, Karine, “The Economic and social role of Internet Intermediaries”, OECD‘s Directorate for Science 
Technology and Industry, (2010), pp. 9-14 available at www.oecd.org, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
3Stamatoudi I., “The role of Internet Service Providers. Ethics, Reality and the Law: The Example of 
Promusicae v. Telefonica”, in Maria Bottis (ed.), “Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry” from 8th 
International Conference Corfu, 26-28 June 2009 Ionio University, Nomiki Vivliothiki, (2009), Athens, p. 750-
767 
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to block distribution. Secondly, ISP can identify the infringer and make it possible for right 
holders to legally prosecute by handing over personal information. Thirdly, right holders 
realized how difficult it is to find and prosecute the end users due to the problems regarding 
the disclosure of private data, and that it is far easier to go after the ISPs as ‘enablers’ since 
these infringements would have been impossible without the ISPs’ services. A legal ground 
for this claim was found on the basis of ‘strict liability’ theory, stating that negligence or 
omission of certain acts can be considered as an act of infringement.  
 
1.4 Why are ISPs not disclosing users’ personal data? 
 
 Strictly speaking, an ISP can disclose personal data regarding the infringer. They are 
in the possession of a technology to do so easily.  
 However, no right exists without limitations. The right to property and the right to 
effective protection of property (right to effective remedies) are limited in a sense by the 
right to privacy and confidentiality of communication. Personal data is considered as 
sensitive data and should not be disclosed easily as it can negatively impact the data subject 
if fallen in the wrong hands. Legislation does allow for the disclosure of personal data, 
however in a limited number of occasions and under a strict procedure performed by an 
appropriate authority.  
 Regulations and case law reviewed in this paper are an attempt to find the adequate 
balance between these rights and resolve the problem of who should be considered liable 
for online infringements. However, none of them have given a definite solution. They only 
provide guidelines as directions to follow in search for a solution.  
 In the end, even though identification of the user is not a problem for an ISP 
technically, legally it is a complicated problem without a clear solution. Additionally, ISPs 
are greatly concerned with losing their clients (users) if they disclose their personal data to 
third parties.  
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2. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON THE LIABILITY OF ISPS 
 
2.1 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (E-Commerce Directive)  
 
2.1.1 The aim of the Directive 2000/31/EC 
 
 The reason for the enactment of the E-Commerce Directive, was the intention to 
use the advantages of Single Market and single currency to establish a new, digital 
dimension of the Single Market which was believed to “promote trade, stimulate innovation 
and competitiveness, create sustainable jobs and offer better quality of goods and services 
for lower prices”4. Hence, the European Union wanted to take full advantage of unique 
commercial possibilities and by enacting this Directive it gave the operators, the ISPs, legal 
certainty to operate their business and digital services without interruption or excessive 
obligations.  
 Main objective of this Directive is to remove legal barriers and enable free 
movement of informational society services which would facilitate online transactions as a 
major asset of internal market5, hence the provisions dealing with the liability of ISPs and 
the exemptions thereof are the tools needed to achieve such objectives.  
 The transactions which were going through ISPs’ services also included transactions 
of intangible property such as copyright. Issues arose once transactions of these goods were 
performed without authorization of the right holders, which is necessary for legal 
transaction. The right holders wanted to protect their rights and turned to ISPs as the ones 
in the best technical position to terminate the infringements. 
 The exemptions from liability are rebuttable presumptions if all conditions are met 
and do not need judicial involvement to be established, therefore serve as a ‘shield’ for ISPs 
to provide information services on a consistent base.  
 
                                                 
4 Livolsi, Thomas, "Scope of the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC of June 8, 2000," Columbia Journal of 
European Law vol. 7, no. 3 (Fall 2001): pp. 473-476. 
5 Claudia Andrea Hernández Sánchez, “ The meaning of the information society services in the E-commerce 
Directive”, University of Oslo, Hosten , (2005), pp. 1-60 
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Exemptions from liability  
 
2.1.2 Mere conduit (Article 12 of the E-Commerce Directive) 
 
In instances when ISP provides transmission as an automatic transfer of data which is 
stored for a limited period of time necessary to complete the transmission, and if the ISP is 
not actively and intentionally involved in the transmission, the ISP shall enjoy immunity, 
even if the data transferred is copyright infringing.  
In order for an ISP not to be considered actively and intentionally involved in the 
transmissions, the ISP must not: 
a.  Initiate transmission,  
b.  Select the receiver of the transmission,  
c.  Select or alter transmitted information.6 
This provision is important especially when copyright infringement has been 
performed through P2P file sharing, as ISP has enabled the connection between two peers. 
In these situations right holders cannot hold ISPs liable as they were not actively involved 
in the transmission, they only connected ‘peers’. Knowledge does not play an important 
role here unlike in Articles 13 and 14, as ISPs should not have any. The moment ISPs acquire 
any knowledge of the content transmitted through their services, they can no longer enjoy 
the immunity as this knowledge proves that there has been more involvement than ‘mere 
conduit’.  
2.1.3 Caching (Article 13 of the E-Commerce Directive) 
 
Caching is an act of storing data in cache (a type of temporary computer memory). 
This act is performed when data is accessed for the first time. If the same data is requested 
later on, the browser will get it from the cache, and not from the original server. This is done 
for the user’s convenience as it allows faster response and disburdens internet traffic.   
                                                 
6 Article  12(2) of the Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce  
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Occasionally, the data stored in cache is condemned as infringing and in case of 
caching as automatic, intermediate and temporary storage, an ISP will not be liable for the 
infringement if the sole purpose of the storage was to efficiently facilitate onward 
transmission and  given that the ISP:  
a. does not alter cached data, 
b. complies with  the condition on access to the data, 
c. regularly updates and monitors the data stored in cache in a manner widely 
recognised and used by the industry.  
In instances when data is requested, the browser will show data previously stored 
in cache, which might not be up to date with data found on the original server. In order to 
avoid saving the infringing content even in cache, the ISP should regularly update and 
remove the data from cache memory, which can no longer be found at the original source.  
d. lawfully uses the technology, recognised and commonly used by industry, to 
obtain data on the use of information, 
e.  acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to cached data if actual 
knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the 
transmission has been removed from the network or access to it has been 
disabled, or that the court or administrative authority has ordered such 
action is acquired.7 
In comparison to mere conduit, ISP does more in the sense that it temporarily stores 
data. Two obligations can be distinguished here, initially an ISP should not interfere with 
the data as in the mere conduit provision, unless it acquires ‘actual knowledge’ which 
triggers an obligation to remove or restrict access to it.  
Article 13(2)(e) presents an issue regarding the meaning of the term ‘actual 
knowledge’. The Directive does not provide the definition of this term and courts have had 
trouble defining it. This also creates legal uncertainty for ISPs and right holders, as ISPs are 
not sure when they have gathered enough knowledge to act and right holders are not 
certain if they have provided enough information for ISPs to acquire ‘actual knowledge’. 
                                                 
7 Article 13(1) of the Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce 
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Steps to define it in more detail were taken within national laws, although this was not 
uniformly done and has led to defragmented interpretation of the term ‘actual knowledge’.8 
 
2.1.4 Hosting (Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive) 
 
Hosting is a type of service where ISPs provide their customers with space on a server 
to publish content. An ISP will not be liable for the infringing content stored at the request 
of a recipient if it: 
a. “Does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and as regards 
claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal 
activity or information is apparent.”9 
Here, the Directive makes a distinction: to be held liable, an ISP has to have an ‘actual 
knowledge’, while for the damages it is sufficient that they have a constructive knowledge of 
the surrounding circumstances.  
b. Obtains such knowledge or awareness and acts expeditiously to remove or disable 
access.10 
Even though hosting someone else’s content is still a passive role for an ISP, the 
Directive imposes “duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from [ISPs]”11. This 
comes close to the common law ‘strict liability’ theory. Even though an ISP did not infringe 
IPRs, the ISP provided services which were used by a third party to infringe IPRs. As this is a 
common practice known to ISPs, they are expected to exercise duties of care to prevent 
these actions or expeditiously terminate them. If the duty of care has not been shown, even 
                                                 
8 For further reference see Spanish Supreme Court cases SGAE v. Asociación of Internautas and Quejasonline 
case. “Spanish law has given definition of when ISP have actual knowledge a) That there is a prior decision, 
either by a court or by an administrative body, b) That the copyright infringement is voluntarily recognized, c) 
Other measures that may be established – this is the problematic part. Does this mean there will be further 
legislation that will define “other measures” (strict or closed interpretation) or does this include any other form 
of acquiring knowledge (open interpretation)”. For further reference see Peguera Miquel, “Internet Service 
Providers’ Liability in Spain Recent Case Law and Future Perspectives” available at 
https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-1-3-2010/2823/peguera-isp-liablility-spain.pdf, last accessed on 
30.01.2018. 
9 Article 14(1) (a) of the Directive on electronic commerce 2000/31/EC 
10 Article 14 (1) (b), ibid 
11 Recital 48, ibid  
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though there is no direct correlation between the ISP and the infringement, the ISP will be 
considered liable due to negligence or omission.  
In instances when ISPs host their own content indirectly through the recipient of the 
service who is acting under the authority or the control of the ISP12, there is no ground for 
immunity on the basis of this Article.  
Hosts can exercise different levels of influence on the hosted content. Hosts which 
“have a greater influence on and control over the websites than traditional hosting 
providers, it is generally assumed to […] also have a broader duty of care to ensure that 
their sites and platforms remain free of infringing material”13. Consequently, they should 
constantly be on the lookout for the infringing material which is inconsistent with the Article 
15 of E-Commerce Directive. This inconsistency is due to the absence of the ‘Good 
Samaritan’ clause which can be found in the CDA Section 23014.  If it had existed the ‘Good 
Samaritan’ clause would have enabled ISPs to check hosted material and voluntarily, in good 
faith, remove it without legal consequences.   
 
2.1.5 Gaps and positive aspects 
 
The E-Commerce Directive represents an EU version of the US DMCA ‘safe harbor’ 
provision and the CDA Section 230. With similar conditions, the main difference between 
the two systems lies in the procedure established by the DMCA for instances when an ISP 
has acquired knowledge about the existence of the infringing content (‘Notice and Take 
                                                 
12 Article 14(2), ibid 
13 Sloot, Bart van der, “Welcome to the Jungle: The Liability of Internet Intermediaries for Privacy Violations 
in Europe” available at https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-6-3-2015/4318, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
14 CDA Section 230 (c)  
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive material 
(1)Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider. 
(2)Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of— 
(A)any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider 
or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or 
(B)any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical 
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1)” 
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Down procedure’). The DMCA provides a very detailed explanation of the procedure and 
notification forms, thereby eliminating a possibility of misinterpretation, which can be seen 
in Terms of Services of many platforms situated in the US such as YouTube, Facebook, and 
Instagram which simply copy the DMCA and CDA provisions. 
Another significant gap left by the Directive is the lack of guidance for private 
notification procedure in relation to the infringing content existing on ISPs’ platform.  As 
according to article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, ISPs cannot constantly monitor 
transferred data, hence private notification procedure might be the most important and 
the effective way how ISPs would acquire knowledge of the infringing material. 15 
A positive side of this Directive is that it has given a clear answer to whether Member 
States can impose obligations on ISPs to monitor the information which they transmit or 
store or actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity, as they provide 
services as mere conduit, caching and hosting.16 A negative answer has confirmed that the 
EU clearly stood against mass-surveillance and acknowledged the difficulties and dangers 
thereof.  
The E-Commerce Directive did not establish general liability, but rather exemptions 
therefrom. This is probably due to the differences existing in Member States’ copyright 
laws, especially concerning the exemptions and limitations regarding the legal use of 
copyright protected works, hence the formulation needed to be such so that it could be 
transposed into any legal framework. 
However, the Directive has left space for national legislators to impose an obligation 
on ISPs to promptly inform competent authorities of alleged illegal actions or communicate 
the information which would enable identification of service recipient at their request. This 
meant that anti mass-surveillance attitude of the EU will not provide shelter for illegal acts 
including IPRs infringements. For this reason the Directive does allow for monitoring in 
specific cases.17  Reviewed provisions granting immunity to ISPs imply that even if they will 
                                                 
15 Cantillon, Sinead, "Property for Free; an Analysis of Music and Copyright in the Digital Age," Hibernian 
Law Journal 11 (2012): pp. 35-62. 
16 Article  15(1) of the  Directive on electronic commerce 2000/31/EC 
17 Recital 47, ibid  
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not be held liable for copyright infringements, this would not stop authorities to order ISPs 
to take action to terminate or prevent future infringing acts.  
 
2.2 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market 
 
The main disadvantage of all regulations regarding digital environment including ISPs 
liability, is that they have already been outdated at the moment of their endorsement. The 
pace of changes in digital environment is far swifter than any legal system can react to, and 
the continuous update is necessary. As “Digital Single Market strategy aims to create digital 
environment for the flourishing of online economy”18, the Proposal  attempted to resolve 
the rising issue of digital piracy by new regulation of ISPs’ liability in order to facilitate proper 
functioning of Single Market.  
The Proposal introduces an obligation for ISPs which “store and provide access to the 
public to copyright-protected works uploaded by their users, thereby going beyond the 
mere provision of physical facilities and performing an act of communication to the public, 
to conclude licensing agreements with right holders, unless they are eligible for [hosting 
liability exemption]”19.  In addition, ISPs should “ensure the functioning of agreements 
concluded with right holders for the use of their works […] or to prevent the availability on 
their services of works”20. To secure the enforcement of these agreements, the ISPs should 
employ the “use of effective content recognition technologies”21.  
Article 13, read in line with the recitals 38 and 39 of the Proposal, presents an 
innovative yet problematic solution. The issue arises as these provisions are not compatible 
with the existing EU legislation, specifically the E-Commerce Directive and CJEU case law. 
Recital 38 misinterprets communication to the public as “storing and providing access to 
                                                 
18 “Shaping Digital Single Market- the Digital Single Market strategy” available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market, last accessed on 
30.01.2018. 
19 Recital 38 (1) Proposal for Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market 
20 Article 13 (1), ibid 
21 ibid 
  
PAGE | 19  
 
the public of copyright-protected works”22 while E-Commerce Directive excludes ISPs’ 
liability for this act. According to the recital 38 hosting provider is “considered publisher, 
thus could be liable for all infringements of all laws that may be committed by their users 
even without actual knowledge”23 in instances when they “optimise the presentation of or 
promotion of the uploaded works or other subject matter”24 as this “goes beyond action of 
mere provision of physical facilities and performing an act of communication to the 
public”25. In addition to being contrary to the wording of the existing legislation and Sabam 
v Netlog case, this change would have a “ ’chilling effect’ on freedom of expression, and a 
massive private censorship, undermining innovation and competition”26, amplifying the 
pre-existing issues.  
The Proposal specifically chose CRT as an efficient, appropriate and proportionate 
measure to ensure enforcement of concluded agreements.27 CRT requires constant 
monitoring of all data passing through ISP’s service, thus imposing a general monitoring 
obligation prohibited by Article 15 of E-Commerce Directive. Additionally, the CJEU 
confirmed in the Netlog case, that such filtering systems do not strike a fair balance among 
fundamental rights as they cannot recognise legal uses of copyright protected works 
(parody, reviews, etc.).28 It is also not advisable for a legislation to tie itself to one specific 
technology as the rapid evolvement of such technologies would make the provision 
outdated.  
As a conclusion, the EU has taken steps to update the existing legislation in 
accordance with technical developments and has also recognised the benefits of technology 
                                                 
22 “Updated position paper: Article 13 remains a terrible idea and needs to be deleted” available at  
https://www.communia-association.org/2017/09/14/updated-position-paper-article-13-remains-terrible-idea-
needs-deleted/, last accessed on 30.01.2018.  
23 Further reference see “Deconstructing the Article 13 of the Copyright proposal of the European 
Commission” available at https://edri.org/files/copyright/copyright_proposal_article13.pdf, last accessed 
30.01.2018.   
24 Recital 38 (2) of the Proposal for Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market 
25 Recital 38 (1), ibid 
26 “Deconstructing the Article 13 of the Copyright proposal of the European Commission”, pp.2, available at 
https://edri.org/files/copyright/copyright_proposal_article13.pdf, last accessed 30.01.2018.   
27 Article 13(1) of the  Proposal for Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market 
28 For further reference see Angelopoulos, Christina, “On Online Platforms and the Commission's New 
Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market”, Centre for Intellectual Property and 
Information Law (CIPIL) University of Cambridge, UK, (2017), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947800, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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in the battle against cyber piracy. However, any future development of the EU legal system 
should be in consistency with the existing legal system, especially the E-Commerce 
Directive, its wording and principles set up by the CJEU case law while taking into account 
the drawbacks of existing CRTs. Nevertheless, the proposal did leave space for future 
improvement in the form of “notice-and-action system or a duty of care for intermediaries 
to remove notified content”29 (the ‘Good Samaritan’ clause). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29Angelopoulos, Christina, “On Online Platforms and the Commission's New Proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market”, Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law (CIPIL) 
University of Cambridge, UK,  (2017),  available at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947800, last accessed on  
30.01.2018. 
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3. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE  HARMONIZATION OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 
AND THE  ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
3.1 Harmonising copyright and related rights in the EU information society 
 
Primarily, copyright right holders base their rights on national legislations which vary, 
from one country to another leading to defragmentation and preventing the free 
movement of goods and services across the Member States’ borders. The InfoSoc 
Directive30  took on the task to harmonise some aspects of copyright and related rights in 
order to make their ‘trade’ on the internal market easier, benefiting the creators as they 
would have access to a market wider than their national and, also benefiting the market 
itself as it would avoid problems regarding application of private international law. Directive 
was widely criticised as being written for main players (publishers, broadcasters) and not 
for the creators.31  Its objective is to establish and define rights, while the Enforcement 
Directive contains provisions dealing with their implementation and enforcement.   
The InfoSoc Directive provides a reasoning as to why a uniform liability of ISPs towards 
copyright protected content is still aim out of reach. The InfoSoc has established exceptions 
and limitations allowing legal use of copyright works without authorisations and/or a fee.  
Each Member State can choose which of the exceptions and limitations to transpose into 
national legislation, which implies that what is considered a legal use in one country does 
not necessarily mean that it would be a legal use in another as the States may have not 
transposed the same exception or limitation from the InfoSoc Directive. Due to these 
conditions it is not possible to pass legislation at an EU level which would definitively state 
which content should be blocked or removed by ISPs as infringing.  
However, in Article 8 (3) it did provide for a ‘tool’ to right holders to combat online 
infringements by allowing injunctions against ISPs whose services were used by a third party 
                                                 
30 Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society  
31 Larsson, Stefan, "The Path Dependence of European Copyright," SCRIPTed: A Journal of Law, Technology 
and Society vol. 8, no. 1 (2011), pp. 8-31. 
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to infringe their rights regardless of ISPs’ liability. Further specifications are left to each 
Member State due to procedural differences, with an aim for injunctions to be effective, 
proportional to the infringing action and circumstances, and dissuasive for further 
infringements. Even though the Directive stands for a “rigorous, effective system for the 
protection of copyright” 32  its provisions “shall be without prejudice to provision regarding 
[…] security, confidentiality, data protection and privacy”33, meaning it omitted to regulate 
if ISPs should disclose user’s personal data for the purpose of court proceedings.  
 
3.2 Enforcing IPRs in the digital environment 
 
Due to the flourishing of digital piracy, the ‘offline’ EU enforcement legislation was 
unable to deliver the needed effect. Passing of the Enforcement Directive34 was not 
supported by great political enthusiasm, although it was needed. It integrated provisions of 
TRIPS Agreement, providing minimum rights for right holders at the EU level while allowing 
Member States to grant preferable status. Due to the unfavourable political environment 
some “provisions, notably those that go beyond TRIPs Agreement were limited to 
infringement of IPRs committed on a commercial scale or causing significant harm to the 
right holder”35 and to claims for IPRs infringements in civil proceedings36.  
The Enforcement Directive seems to be an elaboration of the Article 8 of InfoSoc 
Directive. It has repeated the same aim of ‘effective, proportional and dissuasive’ measures, 
procedures and remedies by obligating Member States to “provide for the measures, 
procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the enforcement of IPRs covered by it”37. 
                                                 
32 Recital 11of the InfoSoc Directive (2001/29) 
33 Article 9, ibid 
34 Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights  
35Reinbothe Jorg, “The EU Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC as a Tool for Copyright Enforcement” in 
Stamatoudi I. (ed.), “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet” , Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 
(2010), pp. 3-27 
36 The Enforcement Directive focuses on civil proceedings and civil sanctions. It has left out criminal sanctions, 
as they proved to be too big of an obstacle in the process of negotiation and were later introduced in a separate 
Amended proposal for Directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights known as IPRED 2. 
37 Article 3(1) of the Directive 2004/48/EC on enforcement of IPR 
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For the right holders, Article 11(3) is the most important, obligating Member States 
to “ensure that right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against 
intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe”38 their copyright 
regardless of the ISPs’ liability. This provision intended to ease the resistance of ISPs 
towards the implementation of injunctions. They will not be held liable for the infringement 
committed by their users, however, they will have to act to stop it. Injunctions against ISPs 
may consist of taking down the infringing material, which could satisfy right holders as their 
work would no longer be publicly available and they would not have to initiate a 
complicated procedure to identify and prosecute the person who uploaded it.  
Additionally, Article 8 imposes an obligation to Member States to ensure that judicial 
authorities can upon proportional and justified request by right holders order ISPs to 
disclose information on the origin of the services infringing copyright, as they are “found to 
be providing on a commercial scale services used in the infringing activities”39.  
These provisions should have been the ‘golden ticket’ for right holders, however they 
did not bring about such effect. Even though, it is an obligation of the State, a court has the 
freedom to decide whether to order information disclosure, thereby lessening the impact 
of these provisions. States and their judicial authorities have been greatly reluctant to 
deliver such decisions due to the lack of indications specifying when the request of the right 
holder will be considered ‘justified and proportional’ to order disclosure of personal data.  
Along with the InfoSoc Directive, the Enforcement Directive represents cornerstone 
of the battle against piracy in cyberspace. It can be noted that the Enforcement Directive 
has tilted the balance in favour of the right holders, by allowing courts to order disclosure 
of data regarding users using ISPs’ services for infringing acts. On the other hand, it did not 
provide answers to the status of ISPs in such situations.  
 
                                                 
38 Article 11(3) of the Directive 2004/48/EC on enforcement of IPR 
39 Article 8 (1) (c), ibid 
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4. EU LEGAL FRAMEWORK REGULATING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND PROCESSING OF PERSONAL 
DATA 
 
4.1 Protection of individuals in the processing of personal data 
 
Privacy and protection of personal data represent one of the main obstacles in the 
enforcement of copyright in digital cyberspace. As the date states, the Directive 95/46  was 
enacted long before digital piracy gained such influence on the internal market, therefore 
some of its provisions are not tailor made for online environment. It has provided a starting 
point from which more appropriate directives have been developed and it is being 
continually revised by the Article 29 Working Party. 
The aim of the Directive is to preserve anonymity on the Internet, in the sense that 
users do not have to reveal their personal data when this is not necessary, in order to access 
certain information services. The Directive also introduced ‘the minimality principle’ which 
prohibits the collection of data without a specific purpose and for the duration longer than 
is necessary.40  
The importance of this directive in the battle against digital piracy increased after the 
CJEU decision in Breyer41 case confirmed that dynamic IP address is personal data, and 
therefore enjoys all privileges and protection under this Directive. An IP address per se 
cannot identify an individual, but when combined with other data in possession of ISPs, it 
can point to a single person.  
The Working Party is of the opinion that databases of personal data may be used only 
for the purpose they were created for. As ISPs have databases of users’ personal data for 
the purpose of providing telecommunication services, it would not be legal for them to use 
the databases in order to facilitate court proceedings. 42 
                                                 
40 Article 6 of the Directive 95/46  on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data 
41 The CJEU case Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland C-582/14 
42 Article 29 Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, 
“Working document on Data protection issues related to intellectual property rights”, January 2005, available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2005/wp104_en.pdf,  last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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However, Directive 95/46 introduced exemptions which allowed Member States to 
adopt legislation restricting the protection provided by the Directive43. What is particularly 
important for the topic of ISPs’ secondary liability is that one of the reasons for restriction 
is “the protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others”44.  
There are two interpretations of this provision. According to the first interpretation, 
Member States can adopt legislation which allows ISPs to make available to the third party 
(the right holder of the infringed copyright) user’s personal data as the right to property of 
the third party has to be protected. The second interpretation reflects on Recital 30, which 
states that “the data can be processed in the legitimate interest of a natural or legal person 
if the rights and freedoms of the data subject are not overriding”45. The Directive itself has 
not given a clear answer if piracy would be perceived as sufficient to overrule the protection 
of privacy. It has however allowed Member States to make such decisions for themselves. 
In order to solve the problem of digital piracy, without infringing the right to privacy 
or turning ISPs into copyright police, Article 29 Working Party has called for the 
development of technologies which would a priori prevent infringements and in cases 
where an investigation is carried out by private actors such as copyright holders or their 
representatives, for it to be strictly in a clear legal framework along the established 
principles.46 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Restricting the scope of articles: Article 6.1. - principle relating to data quality, Article 10.-Information in 
cases when data is collected from data subject, Article 11.1.information when data is not collected from data 
subject, Article 12 – right of access, Article 21.- publicizing of processing operations; Directive 95/46 
44 Article 13(1)(g) of the Directive 95/46   
45 Recital 30, ibid   
46 Article 29 Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data, 
“Working document on Data protection issues related to intellectual property rights”, January 2005, available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2005/wp104_en.pdf,  last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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4.2 Processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector 
An updated version of the Directive 95/46 is the Directive on privacy and electronic 
communications 47 with an objective to harmonise the protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, primarily the right to privacy and secrecy of communication in the electronic 
communications sector. The Directive intended to raise the standard of privacy protection 
in electronic communications by proactively engaging users by allowing them to exercise 
their privacy choices.48 This was done by introducing an ‘opt-in’ cookie49 policy, in the sense 
that users first need to give their consent and only then the data can be stored and 
processed, contrary to the pre-existing ‘opt-out’ cookie policy.  
As publicly available communication services present a new danger for personal data 
and privacy50 the Directive imposes an obligation on ISPs to take measures to safeguard the 
security of their services. This consists of informing subscribers of possible dangers, how to 
avoid them and if any new unforeseen risks arise, it is ISP’s obligation to resolve it at their 
own cost. 51 
Article 3 restricts the scope of the Directive to only publicly available communication 
services. This is considered to be limiting and amendment has been made to include private 
communication services which are intentionally open for public access.52  However, this was 
not changed even with the Directive 2009/13653 .  
                                                 
47 Directive 2002/58 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications)  
48 Carolan, Eoin; Castillo-Mayen M. Rosario. "Why More User Control Does Not Mean More User Privacy: 
An Empirical (and Counter-Intuitive) Assessment of European E-Privacy Laws," Virginia Journal of Law & 
Technology vol. 19, no. 2 (Winter 2015) pp. 352 
49 Cookies are a pieces of data that is assigned to users by host in order to enable or enhance their experience 
of service by tracking users’ behavior and activity on site.  
50 Recital 6 Directive on privacy and electronic communications 2002/58 
51 Recital  20 ibid 
52 For further reference see Dumortier, Jos. "Evaluation and Review of the ePrivacy Directive." European Data 
Protection Law Review (EDPL) 2.2 (2016), pp. 247-252 
53 Recital 55 of the Directive 2009/136/EC amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws  
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Even though the aim of the Directive was to upgrade privacy protection by prohibiting 
surveillance or interception of communication, Article 15 allowed Member States to adopt 
legislation that may restrict guaranteed privacy of communication when they find it to be 
necessary, appropriate and proportionate within a democratic society. As one of the 
reasons for the restriction is mentioned in the Article 13 of the Directive 95/46, which allows 
for the restriction to the protection provided that the rights and freedoms of others have 
to be protected. In a sense, the Directive has modernized, but also repeated the same 
mistake as the Directive 95/46, giving no guidance as to which rights and freedoms could 
repeal the protection of private data.  
 
4.3 General Data Protection 
 
 As a step in the process of legal innovation, EU enacted the General Data Protection 
Regulation which “replaces the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC and was designed to 
harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, to protect and empower all EU citizens’ data 
privacy and reshape the way organizations across the region approach data privacy”54. 
GDPR aims to award constant protection to natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and the rules relating to the free movement of personal data55 in a “data-
driven world”56. The GDPR is applicable regardless of the technology used for the processing 
of personal data (non-automated or automated), “assuring that protection afforded by the 
GDPR is not circumvented through the use of various techniques”57. 
While GDPR is awaiting its enforcement in May 2018, it has already initiated 
debates. GDPR strives to find a balance between the right to privacy and the right to 
information; however, it does tilt the balance in favour of privacy which can clearly be seen 
in the ‘Notice and Take Down procedure’. This procedure is used to enforce the right to be 
                                                 
54 “GDPR Key Changes” available at https://www.eugdpr.org/eugdpr.org.html, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
55 Recital 12 GDPR 2016/679  
56 Further reference: “GDPR Key Changes” available at https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html, last 
accessed on 30.01.2018. 
57 Salami, Emmanuel, “An Analysis of the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679”, (2017), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2966210 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2966210, last accessed 
on 30.01.2018. 
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forgotten (right to erasure)58, allowing data subjects to request that their personal data 
available online be erased, ceased from future dissemination or to halt processing by third 
parties, under certain conditions.59 The aim of the procedure is to facilitate the removal of 
personal data in order to secure privacy and prevent the misuse of personal data.  
 ‘Notice and Take Down procedure’ is important for ISPs which host third party 
content as it allows them, upon receiving a clear request, to temporarily remove the  
content and investigate the infringement afterwards. If the claim for removal is valid, the 
content will be permanently removed, otherwise the content may be re-published. In 
addition, a subject requesting the removal has the right to ask an ISP to disclose the 
information regarding the user who posted the removed content.60 Furthermore, the ISP 
does not have to inform the user that his post has been removed. Consequently, these 
provisions have initiated a debate on whether there is a balance of rights at all in the silent 
content removal procedure. Likewise, it is sometimes challenging to understand the GDPR’s 
relation to the existing directives, especially E-Commerce Directive, as it remains unclear 
which of them will guide the process of ‘Notice and Take Down’. 61 
The procedure enacted by GDPR, even though not directly connected to copyright, 
was recognized by copyright right holders as a model which could be used to remove the 
infringing content in a similar manner as it removes the personal data available online. 
Therefore a question emerges: Can the procedure ‘Notice and Take Down’ which removes 
first and investigates later, be considered as respectful to the balance of fundamental rights 
referred to by the CJEU in Promusicae case62? It is a personal opinion of the author that 
such procedure would create a large-scale and ‘silent’ censorship, as one would not be 
informed about their content removal or of reasons thereof, which may cause more harm 
than good. Presumption of innocence in this situation would work in reverse since one 
                                                 
58 Article 17 of the GDPR  
59 “GDPR Key Changes: An overview of the main changes under GPDR and how they differ from the previous 
directive” available at https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
60 Daphne Keller, “The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the 2016 General Data 
Protection Regulation”, Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, February 2017, pp. 29-60 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914684, last accessed on 30.01.2018.  
61 Ibid, pp. 60-71  
62 Productore de musica de Esana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana (C 275/06) 
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would first be proclaimed an infringer and then if the infringer initiates a proceeding, the 
opposite could be proved. This procedure, preferred by ISPs and right holders, makes 
freedom of expression and right to receive and impart information an easy target, which is 
not acceptable.  
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5. CJEU CASE LAW 
 
5.1 Searching for a balance between fundamental rights through the case 
Productore de musica de Espana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana (C 275/06) 
 
5.1.1 Background information and the issue  
Promusicae, Spanish non-profit organisation representing music producers, claimed 
that it identified a number of IP addresses which were used for peer-to-peer file sharing 
(using KaZaA file exchange program) specifically music files, in which its members have 
copyright and have not authorized it.63 In order to bring civil proceedings against infringers, 
Promusicae had to identify them, and therefore requested from Telefonica as the ISP to 
disclose the identities and addresses, correlating with particular IP addresses. Telefonica 
refused to do so, citing that Article 12 of the Spanish LLSI interpreted in the light of 
Directives 2001/31, 2001/29, and 2004/48 allows disclosure only in cases of criminal 
investigation, safeguarding public security and national defence64, while Promusicae 
believed that said article should be interpreted in a broader sense so to include copyright 
infringement. The Spanish Appellate Court stayed the proceedings and referred the 
question to the CJEU asking  if the above mentioned directives required  “Member States 
to lay down, in order to ensure effective protection of copyright, an obligation to 
communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings”65? 
 
5.1.2 Court ruling and effect on liability of ISPs   
The aim of the directives mentioned by the Spanish court is to provide effective 
protection of copyright, “however this […] does not prevail over the protection afforded to 
                                                 
63  Opinion of Advocate General Kokott regarding case Promusicae v Telefonica (C-275/06) from 18.07.2007. 
64 Stamatoudi I., “Data protection, secrecy of Communication and Copyright” in  Stamatoudi I. (ed.), 
“Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Kluwer International Law BV, The Netherlands, (2010), pp. 199-
232 
65 Paragraph 41 of the Court decision Promusicae v Telefonica (C-275/06) 
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personal data by Directives 95/46 and 2002/58”66. On the other side, according to the 
Enforcement Directive judicial authorities upon justified and proportional request may 
order to ISPs, as they are providing telecommunication services on a commercial scale 
which are used to infringe copyright, to disclose information of the origin of the service 
infringing copyright.67 In addition InfoSoc Directive allows “injunctions against ISPs whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe copyright”68 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU, states that right holders have the right to protect intangible property and 
the right to an effective remedy69.  
The issue of the case in question is of fundamental rights - equally important and 
protected- opposing each other.  
The Court responded that these provisions had to be read in conjunction with acquis 
communautaire in order to comprehend their true meaning. Having in mind the EU legal 
system as a whole and the language of the referred Directives, the Court could not find that 
acquis communautaire orders Member States to allow disclosure of personal data for the 
purpose of civil proceedings. Additionally, provisions 41, 42, and 47 of the TRIPS Agreement 
do not state that disclosure of personal data is necessary for effective protection of 
copyright. Article 47 of the TRIPS Agreement only gives an option that Member States may 
do so if they find it to be necessary.70 
In the opinion of the CJEU, the only way to solve this gridlock is to find a balance 
among these fundamental rights. A mechanism to find the balance can be found first, in the 
Directive 2002/58 which provides exceptions from confidentiality of personal data, second 
in the directives referred to by national court which coordinate rights regulated by those 
directives and the protection of privacy, and third in the specific circumstances of the case.71 
When implementing measures from transposed directives the authorities should interpret 
                                                 
66 Stamatoudi Irini, “Data protection, secrecy of Communication and Copyright” in Stamatoudi I. (ed.) 
“Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Kluwer International Law BV, The Netherlands, (2010), pp. 213 
67 Article 8(1)of the  Directive 2004/48 on the enforcement of IPR  
68 Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 
69 Article 17- Right to property and article  47 – right to an efficient remedy and fair trail, Charter of the 
fundamental right of the EU  
70 Stamatoudi, Irini. "Ethics, Reality and the Law: The Example of Promusciae v. Telefonica & Lsg v. Tele2" 
Revue Hellenique de Droit International vol. 63, no. 2 (2010) pp. 921-948. 
71 Paragraph 66 of the Court decision Promusicae v Telefonica (C-275/06) 
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them in a manner consistent with national law and general principles and fundamental 
rights of the Community.72  
In conclusion, the national court would have preferred a clear answer to where a ‘fair 
balance’ of fundamental rights is, while the CJEU referred it back to the national court 
without specific guidelines. For ISPs it meant no obligation to disclose their users’ personal 
data unless a Member State finds it necessary due to” their own judgment as to what sits 
well with their socio-legal and economic tradition”73. Unfortunately this has given ISPs no 
legal certainty, as some will be obliged to disclose the information regarding their users, 
while others in similar cases but in different Member States will not. 
 
5.2 Providing access to the Internet is enough to constitute ISP’s secondary 
liability in the case LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten 
GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH (C-557/07) 
 
5.2.1 Background information and the issues  
LSG is an Austrian collecting society representing performers and phonogram 
producers which, requested Tele2 as an ISP to reveal the names and addresses of their users 
whose IP addresses were found to infringe related rights. Tele2 denied this request claiming 
that it was not an intermediary within the meaning of Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive 
and that they do not store trafficking data.74 Austrian Supreme Court had to stay the 
proceeding and referred two questions.  The first question was if “ an access provider, which 
only provides its users with access to the Internet without any other services [such as email, 
FTP or file-sharing services] and without exercising any control, de iure or de facto, could be 
considered as an intermediary within the meaning of Articles 5(1)(a) and 8(3) of 
                                                 
72 Paragraph 70 of the Court decision Promusicae v Telefonica (C-275/06) 
73 Stamatoudi Irini, “The role of Internet Service Providers,  Ethics, Reality and the Law: The Example of 
Promusicae v. Telefonica”, in “Computer Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry” by Maria Bottis (ed.) from 8th 
International Conference Corfu 26-28 June 2009, Ionio University, Nomiki Vivliothiki (2009), Athens, pp. 
750-767 
74 Stamatoudi, Irini, "Ethics, Reality and the Law: The Example of Promusciae v. Telefonica & Lsg v. Tele2", 
Revue Hellenique de Droit International vol. 63, no. 2, (2010), pp. 921-948 
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Directive 2001/29?”75 The second question similar to the one in Promusicae case was 
whether the EU law “precludes Member States from imposing an obligation to disclose to 
private third parties personal data relating to Internet traffic in order to enable them to 
bring civil proceedings for copyright infringements”76. 
 
 5.2.2 Court ruling and effect on liability of ISPs 
The InfoSoc Directive asks Member States “to ensure that right holder are in a position 
to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe [their right]”77. Tele2 was providing a service which was sufficient to infringe 
copyright by a third party, hence such providers will be considered as an intermediaries 
within the meaning of Articles 5(1) (a) and 8(3) of Directive 2001/29. An opinion contrary to 
this would narrow down the application of the InfoSoc Directive by excluding a large 
number of ISPs and severely compromising right holders’ ability to apply for injunctions and 
enforce them.78 This ruling has made clear for ISPs that from the moment of providing 
Internet connection to users, even if they do not exercise any control over it, they could be 
held secondary liable for copyright infringements committed by their users.  
 As for the second question, the CJEU repeated the ruling from the Promusicae case 
stating that it was up to each Member State to decide whether to allow ISPs to disclose 
users’ personal data for the purpose of civil proceedings if they believed it to be suitable to 
achieve intended objective, necessary as it is the least restrictive measure capable to 
achieve the result and proportional stricto sensu meaning the result pursued compared with 
the consequence to the fundamental rights is in balance.79   
 
 
                                                 
75 Paragraph 30 of the court decision LSG V TELE2 (C -557/07) 
76 Paragraph 24, ibid 
77 Article 8(3) Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society 
78 Stamatoudi, I., "Ethics, Reality and the Law: The Example of Promusciae v. Telefonica & Lsg v. Tele2", 
Revue Hellenique de Droit International vol. 63, no. 2, (2010), pp. 921-948 
79 Stamatoudi I,  “Data protection, Secrecy of Communication and Copyright: Conflicts and Convergences – 
The example of Promusiae v Telefonica” in Stamatoudi I.(ed.), “ Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, 
Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, (2010), pp.199-232 
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5.3 Confirming prohibition of obligation of general monitoring by ISPs in the case 
Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
(C-70/10) 
 
5.3.1 Background information and the issue 
 The case was originally brought before the Belgian Court when SABAM, a collecting 
organisation representing authors, composers and publishers brought interlocutory 
proceedings against ISP Scarlet as it had knowledge that Scarlet’s services were used for 
P2P file sharing of copyright-protected works from the SABAM repertoire. SABAM proposed 
to the court to install filtering and blocking systems which would overview all P2P traffic 
and search for copyright-protected works. During the proceeding, the court appointed an 
expert who concluded that out of eleven filtering systems SABAM proposed, seven were 
applicable to Scarlet’s network in order to recognise and block targeted files.80 The Brussels 
Court of First Instance found SABAM’s request legitimate and ordered Scarlet to disable 
unauthorised communication of copyright-protected works to its users. Consequently, 
Scarlet appealed stating that the first instance judgment was directly in conflict with Article 
15 of the E-Commerce Directive. Therefore, the Court of Appeal stayed the proceeding and 
referred a question to the  CJEU asking if it was consistent with the EU law and the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms for Member 
States to allow national courts “before which substantive proceedings have been brought 
[…] to order an [ISP] to install, for all its customers, in abstracto and as a preventive 
measure, exclusively at the cost of that ISP and for an unlimited period, a system for filtering 
all electronic communications, both incoming and outgoing, passing via its services, in 
particular those involving the use of peer-to-peer software, in order to identify on its 
network the movement of electronic files containing a musical, cinematographic or audio-
visual work in respect of which the applicant claims to hold rights, and subsequently to block 
                                                 
80 Paragraph 21 and 22 of the Court decision Scarlet v Sabam (C-70/10) 
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the transfer of such files, either at the point at which they are requested or at which they 
are sent?”81.  
 
5.3.2 Court ruling and effect on liability of ISPs 
The Court was of the opinion that the preventive measure requested by SABAM did 
not ensure balance between competing fundamental rights including ISP’s freedom to 
conduct business.82 Such filtering systems would not be able to distinguish authorised and 
infringing use of works, thereby affecting users’ freedom to receive or impart information. 
From the standpoint of ISP, such injunction imposes new costs, new obligation to monitor 
communication and a new role, online copyright policing which could affect their freedom 
to conduct business. The only winner would be the copyright indicating imbalance among 
these fundamental rights.  
 Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive prohibits national authorities from adopting 
measures which would require an ISP to carry out general monitoring of the information 
that it transmits on its network, thus courts of the Member States will not be able to issue 
injunctions with no geographical, durational or qualitative limits as they are not found to be 
necessary, effective and proportionate as requested by Article 8 of the InfoSoc Directive 
and Article 3 of Directive 2004/48.  
The CJEU reaffirmed neutral role of ISPs, which would enjoy immunity with certain 
exceptions. However, this is not a definitive ‘no’ to filtering and blocking systems. We will 
have to see what will happen if more precise and sophisticated filtering systems emerge in 
the future.83 
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Paragraph  28(1) of the Court decision Scarlet v Sabam (C-70/10) 
82 Farrand, Benjamin  “The Future of copyright enforcement online: Intermediaries caught between Formal 
and Informal governance in the EU” in Stamatoudi  Irini  (ed.) “New developments in EU and international 
copyright law”,  Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, (2016), pp. 397-416 
83 “Press statement and FAQ: Scarlet/Sabam Ruling a vital victory for Internet freedoms” by EDRi available 
at https://edri.org/scarlet_sabam_win , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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5.4 Additional prohibition of general monitoring obligation by hosting providers in the 
case Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v 
Netlog NV (C 360/10) 
 
 5.4.1 Background information and the issue 
This is another case initiated by SABAM however, this time against Netlog (now a part 
of the Twoo), a social networking platform which allowed its users to create profiles to meet 
people. Users of this platform could also share photos and videos and some of the shared 
files were copyright-protected works whose right holders were represented by SABAM. 
Therefore, SABAM initially approached Netlog asking for a compensation for unauthorised 
use of the protected works by its users, but Netlog refused this proposal, which led to the 
court proceeding. 
Although there are similarities with the case SABAM v Scarlet, the defendant in this 
case is a social networking platform acting as a host84 which stored information provided 
by users on its servers85, while Scarlet was an ISP which provided access to the Internet, but 
did not store users’ information, with the exception of cache memory. The question 
referred was the same as in the SABAM v Scarlet case, was it possible for a court to order 
ISPs to install general, permanent filtering system. 86 
 
5.4.2 Court ruling and effects on the liability of ISPs 
The ruling was in consistency with SABAM v Scarlet case, confirming that filtering 
systems without geographical, durational and qualitative limitations may not be imposed 
as an obligation onto ISPs, even though in this case Netlog was storing the infringing content 
                                                 
84 Within the meaning of Article  14 E-commerce Directive  
85 Philippe Laurent, “SABAM v. Netlog (CJEU C 360/10) … as expected!” available at  
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2012/02/20/sabam-v-netlog-cjeu-c-36010-as-expected/ , last accessed 
on 30.01.2018. 
86 Question referred: Can Member States allow national courts to issue injunctions against host whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe copyright by ordering ins  “for all its customers, in abstracto and 
as a preventive measure, at its own cost and for an unlimited period, to introduce a system for filtering most 
of the information which is stored on its servers in order to identify on its servers electronic files containing 
musical, cinematographic or audio-visual work in respect of which SABAM claims to hold rights, and 
subsequently to block the exchange of such files?”, paragraph 25 of the Court decision SABAM v Netlog C-
360/10,  
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in cache memory. Injunctions against intermediaries are the right of right holders; however 
the protection of copyright is not absolute as stated in Promusicae case and it ought to be 
found with respect to the balance of other fundamental rights.  
The filtering system described in the referred question would be contrary to Article 
15 of the Enforcement Directive and fundamental rights, as Netlog was storing data 
provided by users and such filtering system would have resulted in infringement of users’ 
right to privacy and the protection of personal data. Additionally, as current filtering 
systems are not able to distinguish between lawful and infringing uses, it would also impact 
the freedom of information protected by ECHR.87 
Finally, ISPs are certain that regardless of their type and services they provide, they 
have no right to actively monitor services, as opposed to stopping an infringement, once 
they are aware of its existence.88  
 
5.5 CJEU allows national court to adjudicate ‘open-textured’ remedies towards ISPs in 
the case UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH (Case C-314/12) 
 
 5.5.1 Background information and the issue  
UPC Telekabel is a company providing Internet, telephone and TV services to its 
clients. Constantin Film and Wega are film production companies which have detected a 
website allowing unauthorized download and streaming of films to which they hold rights. 
They subsequently requested the UPC Telekabel to block access to the site in question, 
however, the UPC Telekabel refused on grounds that there was no contractual or business 
relationship between the UPC Telekabel and the operators of that particular site. 
 The Austrian court referred two questions to the CJEU regarding this case. The 
national court asked if ISPs could be considered as an intermediary within the meaning of 
                                                 
87 Rosati, Eleonora. "On Netlog, ACTA and the Scope of IPR Injunctions in the EU," Queen Mary Journal of 
Intellectual Property vol. 2, no. 3, UK, (2012), pp. 297-304.  
88 Farrand, Benjamin  “The Future of copyright enforcement online: Intermediaries caught between Formal 
and Informal governance in the EU” in Stamatoudi  Irini  (ed.) “New developments in EU and international 
copyright law”,  Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands,(2016), pp. 397-416 
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Article 8 (3) of the InfoSoc Directive, allowing right holders to apply for injunctions against 
ISPs as their services are used to infringe copyright, even if ISPs do not have business or 
contractual relationship between them and the site providing infringing content. 89 
The second question was if national courts could issue an injunction consistent with 
the EU law and fundamental rights, without specifying measures, which ought to be taken, 
and only stating the intended goal of blocking access to a protected subject matter available 
online, and if ISP could avoid incurring coercive penalties if they proved that they had taken 
all reasonable measures.90 
 
5.5.2 Court ruling and effects on the liability of ISPs 
The CJEU held that Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive does not require ISPs to be in 
any relation to the infringer for the right holders to be able to make an application for an 
injunction. A contrary interpretation would restrict the objective of the Directive, thereby 
excluding a large number of ISPs. In addition, the court provided an example, if UPC 
Telekabel was removed from the transmission, the download and streaming would be 
impossible, thus proving that UPC Telekabel is one of the key actors.91  
 CJEU considered that any injunction issued by a court should aim to achieve the 
balance between the fundamental rights to property, privacy, freedom of information and 
business conduct. It has found that requiring ISPs to block access to a specific site hosting 
infringing content will not be considered disproportionate burden.92 The Court highlighted 
than any measure chosen should “be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine protection or 
                                                 
89 The question referred to the CJEU was if  “Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as 
meaning that a person who makes protected subject-matter available to the public on a website without the 
agreement of the rightholder, for the purpose of Article 3(2) of that directive, is using the services of the 
internet service provider of the persons accessing that subject-matter, which is to be regarded as an 
intermediary within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29?” – paragraph 23 of the Court decision 
UPC Telekabel v Constatnin Film  C 314/12 
90 Paragraph 42, ibid  
91 Paragraph 32, Ibid  
92 Benjamin Farrand, “The Future of copyright enforcement online: Intermediaries caught between Formal 
and Informal governance in the EU” in Stamatoudi  Irini  (ed.) “New developments in EU and international 
copyright law”,  Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, (2016),  pp. 397-416 
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at least making it difficult to achieve and seriously discouraging internet users to attempt 
infringing acts.”93 
  Additionally, unspecified injunctions prohibiting certain outcomes will be more 
suitable for ISPs as they would allow them to determine which technical measures are 
applicable in a particular case while not exposing them to ‘unreasonable sacrifice’. ISP can 
choose from varieties of technical measures such as blocking domain name, IP addresses, 
URLs, de-listing from search index and other hybrid methods. They differ in costs, 
effectiveness, and promptness of implementation.94 
Advocate General was of the opposite opinion that ‘open-textured’ injunctions 
without further specifications, impose a difficult burden on ISPs in terms of how to balance 
the fundamental rights at stake. ISPs seek guidance from courts, as they have no definitive 
way to know if the measures implemented would be considered reasonable and fair unless 
being brought before the court once again. If an ISP overprotects copyright it will infringe 
freedom of information; and if it neglects it, it will be held secondary liable. This may lead 
to a perplexing situation. According to Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, a court 
cannot impose injunction of general surveillance. What will happen if a court issues an 
‘open-textured’ injunction and ISP finds that filtering software is the most suitable in the 
particular case? 95 
For ISPs this ruling was bittersweet. It has given them freedom and flexibility to 
choose mechanisms to terminate and prevent infringements, and through these measures 
they will have to find a balance among the fundamental rights, which is a task challenging 
even for the CJEU.  
 
 
                                                 
93 Christina Angelopoulos, “CJEU in UPC Telekabel Wien: A totally legal court order…to do the impossible” 
available at http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2014/04/03/upc-telekabel-wien/#Third Question, last 
accessed on 30.01.2018. 
94  Faye Fangfei Wang, “Site-blocking Orders in the EU: Justifications and Feasibility”, 14th Annual Intellectual 
Property Scholars Conference (IPSC), Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley,US, 
(August 7-8 2014), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Wang_Faye_Fangfei_IPSC_paper_2014.pdf last accessed od 30.01.2018. 
95Eleonora Rosati, “CJEU says that blocking orders are OK and do not have to be specific” available at  
http://ipkitten.blogspot.rs/2014/03/breaking-news-cjeu-says-that-blocking.html , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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5.6 Extending the reach of awarded injunctions to future infringements through 
the case L’Oréal SA and others v eBay International AG and Others (324/09) 
 
5.6.1 Background information and the issue  
L'Oréal brought this proceeding against eBay and several of its users before the UK 
High Court of Justice, Chancery Division. L'Oréal claimed that eBay users infringed 
trademarks owned by L’Oréal by selling counterfeit products, samples provided to 
distributors free of charge, unboxed products, and non-EEA products on eBay and that eBay 
directed customers (buyers) once they typed keywords corresponding to the names of 
L'Oréal’s trademarks to counterfeited goods which were offered for sale on eBay. 96 The 
question referred to the CJEU asked for clarification regarding injunctions specified in 
Article 11 of Enforcement Directive. Do these injunctions oblige intermediaries to also 
prevent future infringements of IPRs, and not only to terminate the continuation of the 
current one?97  
 
5.6.2 Court ruling and effects on the liability of ISPs 
This question was referred as Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive does not give 
further details regarding the nature of  injunctions and requires Member States to 
determine procedures and conditions for ordering injunctions, as well as methods 
applicable and their duration, all due to variations existing in civil and procedural laws 
among the Member States. However, some Member States have directly transposed Article 
11 into national laws without further specifications.  
 The Court ruled that the correct interpretation of Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Directive was that “national courts with jurisdiction in relation to the protection of 
                                                 
96Smith, Joel and Silver, Joanna (Herbert Smith LLP), “L'Oréal v eBay: a warning to online marketplace 
operators”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice (2011), available at 
http://jiplp.blogspot.gr/2011/08/loreal-v-ebay-warning-to-online.html, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
97 Referred question: ” Where the services of an intermediary such as an operator of a website have been used 
by a third party to infringe a registered trademark, does Article 11 of [Directive 2004/48] require Member 
States to ensure that the trademark proprietor can obtain an injunction against the intermediary to prevent 
further infringements of the said trade mark, as opposed to continuation of that specific act of infringement, 
and if so what is the scope of the injunction that shall be made available?”- paragraph 50 of the Court decision 
L’Oréal v eBay (324/09) 
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intellectual property rights are able to order the operator of an online marketplace to take 
measures which contribute, not only to bringing to an end infringements of those rights by 
users of that marketplace, but also to preventing further infringements of that kind”98. 
For ISPs, this meant that if right holders requested an injunction, that injunction 
obligated ISPs to terminate the existing copyright infringing acts and take necessary 
measures to prevent future infringements of the same copyright.  How this will be executed 
as ISPs are not allowed to actively seek acts or circumstances indicating illegal activity nor 
they can impose general filtering systems ‘hunting’ for specific files, is yet to be seen.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Paragraph 144 of the Court decision L’Oréal v eBay (324/09) 
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6. MECHANISMS AGAINST ONLINE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
6.1 Law-based mechanism – the French HADOPI Law 
 
 A number of countries such as France have chosen to regulate the liability of ISPs 
for third party’s content through statutory regulations.99 There are several positive aspects 
to this mechanism. It ensures unified reaction by all ISPs, unlike the code of conduct which 
depends on the willingness of ISPs. Before the enactment, the law goes through a 
demanding and detailed procedure, with the aim to ensure that it was democratically 
debated by representatives chosen by the public. Additionally, its enforcement is governed 
by public authorities which gives a higher level of certainty that its aims shall be achieved. 
 A negative aspect of this mechanism is that the costs are usually high due to the 
complex procedure of enactment. Its complexity is also reflected in the time needed to 
enact such legislation. Unfortunately, cyberspace is a high-speed environment, where 
changes are common, making this mechanism always late in its reaction. This topic is highly 
technical hence the lack of specific knowledge among public representatives may limit their 
understanding of the problem and possible solutions.  
In the case of France, prior to HADOPI law, several statutory regulations were enacted 
establishing a legal environment in which HADOPI could achieve its aims. Among those laws 
was the Data Privacy Law100, allowing entities representing right holders to collect and 
process personal data in order to enforce copyright and Intellectual Property Code which 
obliged users to ensure that their Internet connections are not used for infringing 
activities.101 
The HADOPI102 legislation created a two-stage response system to online copyright 
infringements. It established HADOPI, an administrative authority, which “reviews alleged 
                                                 
99 Countries which have adopted similar legislation: UK, New Zealand, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia and 
Singapore  
100 Law of Informatics and the Protection of Freedoms of 6 January 1978 
101 Strowel, Alain, “The Graduated Response in France: Is it good to reply to online copyright 
infringements?”  in “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet” in  Stamatoudi I. (ed.), Wolters Kluwer 
International, (2010), pp.147-162 
102 This law was named after the authority it has established -  Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres 
et la Protection des Droits sur Internet 
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instances of copyright infringements [received from sworn agents] and checks whether 
copyright ownership can be confirmed”103. Individual right holders cannot bring the facts 
directly to HADOPI. They have to be represented by a collecting society or ask the 
Prosecutor to indicate a procedure, to ensure that individual right holders may never have 
access to IP addresses or correlating personal data.104 By authorisation of the Data Privacy 
Law, HADOPI can request ISPs to disclose personal data on the basis of the IP addresses 
provided by sworn agents. As a result, the right holders do not have direct access to 
personal data correlating to an IP address, therefore secrecy of personal data is ensured 
while the prosecution of infringers is enabled. 
 In its first, educational stage, the ISPs shall notify the subscriber that his connection 
has been used for infringing activities, only providing the date and time of the infringement 
without disclosing the work that has allegedly been infringed, and the contact information 
of HADOPI for further clarifications. Additionally, the notification contains information on 
legal provisions condemning this activity as illegal, on lawful ways to access copyright-
protected works and an explanation of the negative effects of piracy.105 If HADOPI detects 
a new infringement from the same IP address within six months from the first notification, 
it will send a second notification by registered mail. At this point, the educational stage 
ends. 
Although undervalued, the educational element of this procedure has great potential. 
Research has shown that 70% of users would stop infringement after the first warning and 
additional 16% after the second warning.106 The public is greatly unaware of the infringing 
nature of their own acts, which could be eliminated or minimised through education and 
raising awareness on the negative impact of digital piracy. On the long run, education would 
                                                 
103Strowel, Alain “The Graduated Response in France: Is it good to reply to online copyright infringements?” 
in Stamatoudi I. (ed.), “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International,(2010), pp. 
149 
104Benabou, Valerie-Laure “ The Chase: The French insight into the “three strikes” systems” in Stamatoudi I. 
(ed.),  “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International,(2010),pp.173 
105Strowel, Alain “The Graduated Response in France: Is it good to reply to online copyright infringements?” 
in Stamatoudi I. (ed.), “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International,(2010), pp. 
147-162 
106 Hua, Jie. "Toward a More Balanced Model: The Revision of Anti-Circumvention Rules," Journal of the 
Copyright Society of the USA, vol. 60, no. 3 (2013): pp. 327-364. 
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reduce the widespread of digital piracy performed by private users, thus eliminating the 
need for their prosecution which would save time, money and disburden courts.107 
In the next stage, if HADOPI detects an infringement from the same IP address within 
a year from the second notification, it will initiate a proceeding before a single judge who 
can award a fine or suspension of the Internet connection for the period from two months 
up to a year.108 
Since its enactment, HADOPI has gone through some modifications. Initially, the 
decision regarding the suspension of the Internet connection was in the hands of HADOPI. 
However, French Constitutional Council was among the first to proclaim that Internet access 
is a fundamental right as it is rooted in the freedom of expression. As “no restrictions may 
be imposed on the fundamental rights and freedoms of end users, without a prior ruling by 
judicial authorities”109, the Parliament decided to authorise judicial authorities to decide on 
internet disconnection. After these modification, HADOPI remained authorised to send 
educational notifications, which altered the aim of the law to set up an automated 
procedure to expeditiously prosecute online piracy.110 
For ISPs, HADOPI law has brought legal protection against lawsuits for indirect 
copyright infringements as long as they cooperate with HADOPI and copyright holders.111 It 
saved them money and time which would be spent on setting up a system of their own to 
fight against infringements.112 However, there will be expenses as ISPs will have to establish 
a system allowing them to identify users, send notifications, maintain the data retained, 
etc. These expenses will, in the end, be borne by users through increased fees. Time will 
show if such legislation will result in ISPs losing both clients and profit. If this happens legal 
                                                 
107 Good example of general education of public is copyright school established by O.P.I., providing free and 
interesting age appropriate methods of copyright education. In this manner O.P.I. is trying to ensure that 
future generations will use Internet with more knowledge and respect toward copyright.  
Copyright school can be accessed at http://www.copyrightschool.gr/index.php/en/ , last accessed on 
30.01.2018. 
108 Alain Strowel, “The Graduated Response in France: Is it good to reply to online copyright infringements?” 
in Stamatoudi I. (ed.),  “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International, (2010), pp. 
149-151 
109 Valerie-Laure Benabou, “ The Chase: The French insight into the “three strikes” systems” in Stamatoudi 
I.(ed.),  “Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International, 2010., pp. 175 
110 Ibid 
111 ibid 
112 ibid 
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certainty provided by the law shall no longer be appealing to ISPs and a new mechanism 
shall be installed. 
 
6.2 Soft law mechanism – Dutch ‘Notice and Take Down’ Code of Conduct 
 
In the recent years, there has been a gradual shift from statutory copyright 
enforcement in cyberworld to self-imposed regulations. ISPs have established codes of 
conduct among themselves to cope with the rising problem of digital piracy. They 
established these rules either to substitute for the lack of statutory regulation or to 
complement the existing laws which provided objectives and basic principles. The former is 
an example of the pure self-regulation, which is nowadays rare while the latter is a form of 
co-regulation with public authorities. Pure self-regulation is not advisable as the 
formulation of the provisions is solely in the hands of private parties, giving no guarantees 
to fundamental principles and freedoms.113 
E-Commerce Directive114, Enforcement Directive115 and Proposal for a Copyright 
Directive116 encourage self-regulation and so do states as it liberates them from a long and 
costly procedure of statutory enactment. As ISPs have expert knowledge regarding data 
traffic management, hence the agreed solutions and procedures are developed with a 
better understanding of technical possibilities.  Norm-setting procedure is flexible and, on 
most occasions quicker and cost effective compared to parliamentary procedure. Due to 
the lack of formalities, codes are easily revised and amended, enabling prompt responses 
to changes. However, codes are usually agreed on by stakeholders such as ISPs and right 
holders. Public authority representatives may be involved occasionally, while users are not 
represented at all which questions the democratic nature and transparency of such 
mechanisms, also leaving one major actor unheard in the process. 
                                                 
113 P.B.Hugenholtz, “Codes of conduct and copyright enforcement in cyberspace” in Stamtoudi I. (ed.) 
“Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International, (2010), pp. 305 
114 Article 16 of the E-commerce Directive 2000/31 
115 Article 17 of the Directive 2004/48 on enforcement of IPR  
116 Article 13 (3) of the  Proposal for a Copyright Directive 
  
PAGE | 46  
 
 Mechanisms resolving copyright infringements (removal of the content, termination 
of the account) found in these codes impinge on the fundamental right of privacy, freedom 
of expression and information. In accordance with ECHR these rights are not absolute, they 
can be restricted only by judicial authorities following a fair trial.117 Simple removal by ISPs 
without hearing the other side can be considered contrary to ECHR. 
As codes of conduct represent agreements of preferable behaviour among ISPs, one 
of the drawbacks is that their enforcement shall be as of any other contract.118 If peer 
pressure of other ISPs does not influence the one refusing to follow the code of conduct, 
long and expensive civil proceedings may be the only solution.  
The Dutch NTD Code of Conduct is an example of the co-regulation between the 
government and stakeholders. It went beyond Dutch law in order to clarify the 
responsibilities of ISPs when they encounter unlawful content.  The Code of Conduct 
recognises three types of content: punishable content usually contrary to criminal law, 
unlawful content contrary to civil law and ‘undesirable’ content which is not contrary to the 
Dutch law, but the provider does not want to host it. Here the focus will be on the two latter 
categories. 
For the content to be removed, the Code lays down the order of steps to be taken.  
The notifier119 should first request the removal from the content provider120. As content 
providers are not always known, the notifier then turns to the most appropriate 
intermediary121 by submitting a report providing necessary information, and upon which an 
ISP has a couple of choices. “Where there is no doubt concerning the unlawfulness under 
the civil law of the content concerned, the intermediary should immediately take measures 
                                                 
117 P.B.Hugenholtz, “Codes of conduct and copyright enforcement in cyberspace” in Stamatoudi I. (ed.), 
“Copyright Enforcement and the Internet”, Wolters Kluwer International, (2010),pp. 303-320 
118 Ibid, pp. 306-308 
119 Article 2(b) of the Notice and Take Down Code of conduct “The notifier is a person or organization that 
makes a report” regarding the copyright infringing content; in “Notice and take down code of conduct”, 
Version 1, (2008) available at https://www.ecp.nl/sites/default/files/NTD_Gedragscode_Engels.pdf , last 
accessed on 30.01.2018. 
120 Article 2(c), ibid “The content provider is the person (or organization) that has placed (contested) content 
on the Internet”. 
121 The most appropriate intermediary will be determined from the circumstances of the case, it could be 
owner of the website, or the host of the website or the access provider. Further reference: “Notice and Take 
Down code of conduct”, Version 1, (2008) available at 
https://www.ecp.nl/sites/default/files/NTD_Gedragscode_Engels.pdf pp. 6, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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that lead to the content being taken off-line.”122 However, there are cases when ISPs cannot 
“unequivocally determine whether the content is unlawful”123. When this happens, ISPs 
should first request the content provider to remove the questionable content willingly. If 
they do not comply, ISPs can decide to take down the content, or to provide the notifier 
with the content provider’s contact.124 Under Dutch law, ISPs do not have an obligation to 
retain their clients’ data nor can they be forced to reveal personal data.125  
The category of unwanted content is particularly confusing as it allows the removal of 
content that is not unlawful but simply unwanted. However, the Code does not provide any 
guidelines to what can be considered ‘unwanted’, which means that ISPs can become 
private censors.  
Although providing some clarity to ISPs, the Code has left some questions 
unanswered. It decided not to “even mention the right to freedom of expression and the 
issue of censorship”126. Judiciary role imposed on ISPs in instances when the content cannot 
be proclaimed unequivocally unlawful, may have a strong effect on fundamental rights.  
Generally speaking, ISPs prefer self-regulation over statutory, as they have more 
influence on its formulation. This could also be said for some major right holders as they are 
more actively involved when compared to statutory procedure. However, the Code of 
Conduct functions the best if fundamental rights and principles are regulated by law and 
the Code is used as an annex to the law. It should focus on issues which are usually not 
regulated by law such as technical issues, a detailed procedure, education of users, etc. 
Additionally, representation of users is necessary as they are also the key stakeholder, 
otherwise the democratic nature is seriously endangered.  
 
 
                                                 
122 “Note to article 6b”, ibid  
123 “Note to article 6c”, ibid.  
124 Article 6c of the NTD Code of Conduct  
125 Case law has provided some criteria on when ISPs should provide the notifiers with the content provider’s 
information: when the content: “could be unlawful in respect of the notifier, lead to damage being caused to 
the notifier, or if a less drastic way to obtain the name and contact details is unavailable to the notifier”. 
Further reference: “Note to article 6c”, ibid.  
126Joris van Hoboken,“New Dutch Notice-And-Take-Down Code Raises Questions” available at  
http://history.edri.org/edri-gram/number6.20/notice-take-down-netherlands , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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6.3 Mechanism established by a private entity – Content ID 
 
Mechanisms established by private parties are usually used as an additional measure 
to ensure that they act in a legal manner enabling them to enjoy immunity from liability for 
third party content.  
 Such mechanisms usually have the form of content recognition technologies, which 
are able to recognise targeted content and perform certain acts (disable access to it in 
whole or in part, mute it, etc.). Usually, host providers who are hosting excessive quantities 
of third party content use CRT in order to ensure prompt recognition and removal of the 
infringing content.  Positive aspect of a mechanisms established and enforced by a private 
party is that they are tailor-made for the needs of specific ISP, and therefore function better 
than generally imposed mechanisms. However, as the design of such mechanism is solely 
in the hands of a private party without the involvement of authorities, unlike with previous 
mechanisms, ‘democratic deficit’127 is evident. Additionally, this is expensive technology 
which can be challenging for less affluent platforms, hence CRT might not be ‘a one-size fits 
all’ solution. 
There are many content recognition technologies128 in use, yet the Content ID is 
widely known as it is implemented by YouTube. Content ID is necessary on platforms such 
as YouTube because the quantity of content uploaded, (300 hours per minute), makes it 
impossible for manual examination.  
 Content ID can be considered as a contractual and technical tool used by YouTube 
“increasing a copyright holder’s control over every use of their work”129. 
It consists of a database and an algorithm. The database is composed of ‘reference 
files’, audio and video recordings submitted by the “right holders which have exclusive 
                                                 
127 Definition of democratic deficit taken and adapted for the purpose of topic from “Glossary of summaries” 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/democratic_deficit.html , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
128 Example: ACRCloud, Audible Magic, Digimarc, Gracenote, Kantar Media, Shazam, etc. 
129 Boroughf, Ben, “The Next Great YouTube: Improving Content ID to Foster Creativity, Cooperation, and 
Fair Compensation”, Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, Forthcoming, (2014), available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2492898, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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rights to the submitted material”130 while the algorithm compares every file uploaded to 
the database and applies certain policies.  
Content ID scans uploaded files, in its search for registered files and, upon finding 
them, conducts a policy chosen by the right holder. It will either “block it, mute it, make it 
unavailable on certain platforms, monetize it or track it”131. If Content ID spots ‘reference 
files’ uploader gets a Content ID claim which they can dispute, in which case YouTube will 
notify the right holder leaving him 30 days to respond.132  
 Right holder can choose to withdraw the claim (or not respond to the dispute), 
uphold it or request for the infringing file to be taken down. If the file is taken down, the 
uploader will get a copyright strike. The copyright strike will last for 90 days if user 
completes an educational course. If a user accumulates three strikes the “account will be 
terminated, videos removed and the user will not be able to create new channels”133. On 
the other hand, right holder can file an unlimited number of claims, regardless if they are 
legitimate or groundless. However, if right holder repeatedly makes groundless or 
unjustified claims, YouTube can terminate partnership with him.134 This is highly unlikely to 
happen if the right holder is someone like UMG, WMG or Sony, which demonstrates 
unbalanced legal positions of right holders and users.  
User can also submit a counter notification if his “upload was removed or disabled as 
a result of a mistake or misidentification of the material, for example, fair use”135. Upon the 
processing of the counter notification, YouTube will forward it to the right holder who has 
                                                 
130 Further reference: ”Qualifying for Content ID” available at  
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402?hl=en&ref_topic=2778544 , last accessed on 
30.01.2018. 
131 For further reference see:” Copyright strike basics” available at 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en , last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
132 For further reference see: “Dispute a Content ID claim”, available at 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797454, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
133 See “Copyright strike basics” available at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000 , last 
accessed on 30.01.2018. 
134 DeLisa, Nicholas Thomas. "You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory 
Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms." Brooklyn Law Review 81.3 (2016), 1275-
1317. 
135 Further reference “Counter Notification Basics” available at 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2807684, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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to provide the proof that he/she has initiated a court action in order to keep the content 
down.  
As Content ID, CRTs have positively affected both right holders and users. 
Monetisation of uploaded contents satisfies the public as they have access to the work, but 
also the right holders as it gives them revenue. Additionally, right holders can choose to 
track the content which was recognised by Content ID, allowing it to stay available and 
economically benefit the copyrighted work.136 The same content would otherwise be 
removed according to legal provisions, implying that CRT, in a sense, distorts legal 
provisions.  As for the ISPs hosting excessive amount of content, automatization is the only 
answer to fight infringement.  
However, there are also downsides to CRTs. Available CRTs are not delicate enough 
to determine if a use is licensed, if it is within the limits of ‘fair use’ or some form of 
derivative work.137 Consequently, it discourages creators to apply for a license and applies 
‘fair use’ in reverse: it is not ‘fair use’ until proven contrary. As an example, Content ID even 
reported videos from Warner Bros. Picture official channel as infringing to Warner Bros. 
Picture rights.138 Due to the automatization, videos containing criticism and reviews are 
taken down if they use parts of copyright-protected work, as the algorithm does not 
distinguish it from egregious infringements. This could be solved by allowing CRT to shut 
down what is unambiguously illegal content139, while in the event of criticism or review ask 
for human assistance for detailed examination.  
 In the case of Content ID application per se is restrictive, since the submission of 
reference files is available only for right holders who have a “substantial amount of content 
                                                 
136 This is usually done to attract publicity to copyright protected work. 
137 For further reference see: Bartholomew, Taylor B. "The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and 
the Problem with Content ID." Duke Law & Technology Review 13 (2014-2015), pp.66-88. 
138 Other cases of Content ID mistakes, Julia Reda, “When filters fail: These cases show we can’t trust 
algorithms to clean up the internet” available at https://juliareda.eu/2017/09/when-filters-fail/ , last accessed 
on 30.01.2018. 
139 Any form of violence, abuse, etc.  
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on YouTube”140. Consequently, a creator must have a record or a publishing deal or sign a 
contract with MCN141. 
 Disadvantage pointed out by founders of major platforms and applications such as 
SoundCloud, Musical.ly, Twitch.tv, Dubsmash, and Vine is that they would have never 
existed if technologies as Content ID had been obligatory at the time of their founding. 
Consequently this could mean that CRT can be an obstacle for further creative, 
technological and economic development for both new and existing companies.  
 Additionally, it is not too complicated to circumvent Content ID by using a reverse 
image, altering pitch and the speed of the song, including muted parts of a song, etc.142 
 As a conclusion, CRTs as Content ID, are a necessity for hosts with large amount of 
third party content, though complete automatization has some disadvantages. In order to 
minimise the disadvantages ISPs should consider adding a human character to the process 
as the technology applicable is not sensitive enough to detect subtle differences hence 
restricting the right to expression and information. In addition, any CRT used should be 
available to all right holders and not only to those with the ‘substantial amount of content’. 
Lastly, mechanisms such as Content ID are established by a private entity, therefore their 
transparency should be imperative in order for users and right holders to know what to 
expect and how to protect their rights and interests.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
140 DeLisa, Nicholas Thomas. "You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory 
Synchronization Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms, Brooklyn Law Review 81.3, pp. 1275-1317 
141 Multichannel networks – aggregate content and cooperate with YouTube just as a record company. 
However, to sign with MCN you have to have a certain number of subscribers. For further reference: DeLisa, 
Nicholas Thomas. "You(Tube), Me, and Content ID: Paving the Way for Compulsory Synchronization 
Licensing on User-Generated Content Platforms." Brooklyn Law Review 81.3, (2016), pp.1275-1317 
142 For further reference: “Fun with YouTube’s Audio Content ID System” available at 
http://www.scottsmitelli.com/articles/youtube-audio-content-id, last accessed on 30.01.2018. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 On the path to the creation of Digital Single Market, the EU will have to resolve the 
issue of cyberpiracy and regulate the status of ISPs in order to secure proper, and 
uninterrupted functioning of information services.  
Compared with other topics, ISP’s liability and digital piracy are more challenging for 
a legal system as they continually develop at a high speed. Therefore, this may be one of 
the areas in which EU should not aim for unification or harmonization but flexibility. 
 After reviewing the existing EU legal framework and CJEU decisions it is certain that 
any solution to digital copyright infringements ought to be sought within existing principles 
and boundaries. The EU has already taken some steps through Article 13 of Proposal for 
Copyright Directive, which confirmed that future solutions ought to be compatible with the 
established exemptions from ISPs’ liability and prohibition of mass surveillance. A solution 
contrary to this would disrupt the existing system, causing confusion and misinterpretation 
rather than enhancing legal certainty for fundamental rights. 
 In author’s opinion, the EU should seek to reach an agreement regarding principles, 
objectives and goals it aspires to achieve in the battle against cyber piracy and collect them 
in a form of regulation, securing their direct implementation in each Member States. 
Furthermore, until this moment EU has accumulated enough experience through the 
CJEU case law and national mechanisms as French ‘three strike system’. These experiences 
should be formulated in a set of new directives focusing on regulation and enforcement of 
IPRs specifically in cyberspace with obligatory revision.  
 In addition to legislative actions, the EU should put greater focus on prevention of 
infringements. Education of general public has shown positive results in preventing 
infringements thus decreasing the need for judicial proceedings and repressive measures. 
Additionally, the development of a sophisticated CRT which would take down evidently 
infringing content aided with human assistance in more complex situations, would create 
an environment where only the most persistent and ignorant infringers would be 
prosecuted.   
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 As ISPs are the main actors ensuring the flow of information services, their neutral 
status is undoubtedly essential for proper, and uninterrupted functioning of the Internet. 
Therefore, ISPs must retain neutral status as long as they follow conditions established by 
the E-Commerce Directive. On the other side, if an ISP uses its immunity to perform or 
contribute to infringing activities, its liability must be certain. However, in order to protect 
other fundamental rights, they should not act as private censors or judges. The decision 
regarding the balance of fundamental rights and their restriction must remain within the 
hands of EU authorities.  
 Copyright holders will have to modify their approach to digital environment if they 
wish to properly exercise their rights. It is highly unlikely for them to expect that digital 
environment will be adapted through legislation in order to facilitate their needs. Film and 
music industries among others will have to modify and adjust their businesses to cyber 
environment, rather than hold onto traditional, offline business models.  
 The same can be said for fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of information. 
Their safeguarding will have to take full advantage of new technologies and the end users 
will have to become aware that cyberspace will not provide an escape from liability. 
 As a conclusion, time will be necessary for the adjustment of public behaviour and 
actions of authorities to combat cyber piracy. During that period, the EU must remain the 
leader and must not transfer challenging decisions to ISPs. This effort is certainly worth as 
the Internet opens up a whole new world of possibilities and opportunities. 
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1. Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v 
Netlog NV (C 360/10). 
2. L’Oréal SA and others v eBay International AG and Others (324/09). 
3. LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 
Telecommunication GmbH (C-557/07). 
4. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott regarding case Promusicae v Telefonica (C-
275/06). 
5. Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-582/14). 
6. Productore de musica de Esana (Promusicae) v Telefonica de Espana (C 275/06). 
7. Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL 
(SABAM) (C-70/10). 
8. UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH (Case C-314/12). 
 
 
